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BACK TO THE FUTURE: FEDERAL MAIL AND WIRE
FRAUD UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1346
John E. Gagliardi
Abstract: In 1988, Congress added section 1346 to the federal mail and wire fraud statutes
to overturn the Supreme Court decision of McNally v. United States and provide statutory
protection of the "intangible right of honest services." This Comment analyzes the extent to
which section 1346 restores the protection of intangible rights as existed prior to McNally and
concludes that most if not all of those intangible rights are again covered by the statutes.
Further, this Comment recommends that the judiciary limit the application of the mail and
wire fraud statutes in the private sector to cases involving a breach of a fiduciary duty which
has a "reasonable foreseeability" of causing harm.

Prosecutors have historically used the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes with great success to attack various kinds of fraudulent schemes
in the United States. Proponents hail the statutes as a versatile weapon
against fraud-a "catchall" device that encompasses crimes not yet
recognized or well defined in other statutes. Critics argue that this
strength is also a weakness because these statutes afford prosecutors too
much discretion and fail to give adequate notice of exactly what type of
conduct the statutes proscribe. Like many criminal statutes, the mail and
wire fraud statutes are subject to the competing demands of flexibility
and adaptability on the one side and established limits on the other. In
1987, the Supreme Court in McNally v. United States' limited the

application of the mail and wire fraud statutes to cases involving crimes
against property rights.
In an apparent effort to maintain the statutes' versatility, Congress in
1988 acted to overturn the McNally decision. Congress added section
1346 to the Code, extending mail and wire fraud protection to the
"intangible right of honest services,"2 as well as to property rights. Yet
the amendment to date has received little substantive judicial
interpretation because the amendment has prospective application only.
In applying section 1346, courts to some extent will have to look to the
interpretation of mail and wire fraud prior to the McNally decision to
determine the statutes' future scope.
This Comment reviews the law of mail and wire fraud as it existed
before McNally and addresses issues courts will face in interpreting this

1. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West Supp. 1993).
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congressional modification of the statutes. It concludes that the "honest
services" language of section 1346 in conjunction with recent judicial
interpretations of intangible property rights should effectively permit use
of the statutes to protect most if not all of those rights protected before
McNally. To address vagueness criticisms of the statutes, this Comment
further suggests that the judiciary tie the "honest services" requirement
of private individuals to a breach of a fiduciary duty that has a
"reasonable foreseeability" of causing economic harm. This standard
would limit the reach of the statutes to conduct that is more clearly
criminal and yet retain the statutes' flexibility in attacking new kinds of
fraud as they arise.
I.

MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD BEFORE SECTION 1346

The federal mail and wire fraud statutes punish "whoever" uses mail
or wire communications to further "any scheme" to defraud.3 Because
these two federal statutes share the same relevant language, court
decisions construing one statute are generally applicable to the other as
well.4 Until recently, both Congress and the Supreme Court favored
broad use of the statutes and consistently expanded their coverage.' This
3. The mail fraud statute states in part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises,... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places
in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by the Postal Service... shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993).
The wire fraud statute states in part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. § 1343 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993).
4. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) ("'he mail and wire fraud
statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same analysis to both
sets of offenses here.").
The only real difference in the two statutes is the means used to effectuate the fraud: the mail in
one and interstate wires in the other. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993) (mail
fraud statute) with id. § 1343 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993) (wire fraud statute).
5. Jed S. Rakoff, The FederalMail FraudStatute (Part1), 18 DUQ. L. REv. 771, 772 (1980). For
a discussion of the history and expansive use of the fraud statutes, see generally id.
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expansion ultimately led to protection of "intangible rights," such as the
public's right to the honest service of government officials,6 as well as
tangible property rights. In 1987, however, the Supreme Court in
McNally v. United States narrowed the reach of the fraud statutes to
protect only property rights.7 In 1988, Congress overruled McNally by
restoring coverage to the "intangible right of honest services."' This
Congressional modification blurs the scope of the statutes. Circuit courts
have as yet had little opportunity to employ the legislative addition to the
fraud statutes 9 and instead have continued to apply the standards
previously established by the Supreme Court."°
A.

The Basic Elements Of Mail and Wire Fraud

While certain aspects of mail and wire fraud thus continue to be in
flux, the judiciary has firmly established the basic elements of the crime.
Courts generally agree that the crimes of mail and wire fraud consist of
two core elements: a scheme to defraud and use of the mails or wires in
furtherance of the scheme." Inherent in the scheme to defraud, and

6. See infra part I. B. for a discussion of intangible rights.
7. 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987).
8. On November 18, 1988, Congress added section 1346 to Title 18. Pub. L. 100-690, Title VII,
§ 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4508 [codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West Supp. 1993)]. Section 1346 states
in full,
"For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme
or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." Id. This amendment applies
to both the mail and wire fraud statutes. 134 CoNG. REC. Hll,251 (daily ed., October 21, 1988)
(hereinafter Legislative History).
9. Most courts conclude section 1346 does not apply retroactively. See, e.g., United States v.
Telink, Inc., 910 F.2d 598, 601 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) (listing cases from other circuits that have
concluded section 1346 has no retroactive effect).
To support prospective application only, courts often cite to the ex post facto clause in the U.S.
3, which prohibits Congress from punishing any act which was not
Constitution, art. I, section 9, cl.
punishable at the time it was committed. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,28-30 (1981). Courts
therefore have not applied the amendment because cases to date have concerned conduct occurring
prior to the enactment of section 1346.
10. See infra part I. D. for a discussion of the controlling Supreme Court cases.
11. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); United States v. Biesiadecki, 933 F.2d
539, 545 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232,235 (6th Cir. 1990).
The second element-use of the wires or mails in furtherance of the scheme to defraud-is
satisfied for mail fraud when the government proves the defendant acted with knowledge that use of
the mails would follow in the ordinary course of business, or where the defendant could reasonably
foresee that use of the mail would result, and the mail is actually used. See Thomas Lynch &
William A. McConagha, Mail And Wire Fraud, 29 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 465, 477 (1992). The
accused need not have actually intended the mails to be used. Id. For wire fraud, the government
must prove only that a wire communication occurred which was reasonably foreseeable. Id. Other
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sometimes listed as a separate third element, is a specific intent to
defraud. 2 Fraudulent intentions are sufficient; the accused need not have
succeeded in the scheme to be guilty of the crime. 3 Before McNally, the
accused's scheme must have merely contemplated some harm or injury
party's tangible or intangible rights.to satisfy this
to the defrauded
14
element.
B.

Coverage Under the IntangibleRights Doctrine

Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has clearly defined "scheme
or artifice to defraud." Lower courts have consequently struggled to
define that phrase. 5 Their interpretation of this vague statutory language
is central to understanding the scope of mail and wire f:aud until 1987.
From the early 1970s until 1987, circuit courts consistently held that
"scheme to defraud" encompassed two general categories. 6 The first
category includes those schemes that seek to deprive others of money or
tangible property rights.' 7 The second category includes schemes to
defraud others of their "intangible rights."' 8 The abstract concept of

issues concerning this second element are beyond the scope of this Comment and thus will not be
addressed.
12. See, e.g., Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d at 235; United States v. Bonallo, 858 F.2d 1427, 1433
(9th Cir. 1988).
13. United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 461 (2d Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 61
U.S.L.W. 3635 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1993) (No. 92-1437); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 545 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied,424 U.S. 976 (1976). See generally Lynch & McConagha, supranote 11, at
466 (reviewing elements of mail fraud).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
909(1974).
15. United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir. 1976).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,447 U.S. 928
(1980); McNeive, 536 F.2d at 1248.
17. Bohonus, 628 F.2d at 1171; McNeive, 536 F.2d at 1248.
18. Bohonus, 628 F.2d at 1171; McNeive, 536 F.2d at 1249.
Some courts have contrasted tangible and intangible rights schemes in the following manner.
A scheme to obtain tangible property is cognizable under the mail fraud statute regardless of the
relationship between the defendant and his victim. In contrast, an intangible rights scheme is
only cognizable when at least one of the schemers has a fiduciary relationship with the
defrauded person or entity.... There can be no doubt that a nonfiduciary who schemes with a
fiduciary to deprive the victim of intangible rights is subject to prosecution under the mail fraud
statute.
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intangible rights escapes clear definition; it generally encompasses a
variety of rights not connected to money or property rights. Cases
brought under this intangible rights theory have fallen roughly into two
groups: one involving corruption of public officials where the scheme is
to defraud the public of honest government service, and the other
involving schemes to defraud private parties.19
The basis for protection of these intangible rights in both these
categories usually arose from the existence of a fiduciary duty. Simply
stated, a fiduciary duty is "[a] duty to act for someone else's benefit,
while subordinating one's personal interests to that other person.'2° The
common law has defined the phrase with deliberate imprecision and
surprising expansiveness.21 Courts have therefore been quite liberal in
finding fiduciary duties in the mail and wire fraud context.'
The first broad group of public corruption cases usually involved
public officials accused of defrauding the public of its right to good

United States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d 979, 984 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Alexander, 741
F.2d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled by United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.
1985)).
The intangible rights doctrine began gaining prominence in the 1970s with the case of United
States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974). The States
court concluded, in an election fraud case, that a scheme to defraud the public of certain "intangible
political and civil rights" was within the scope of mail fraud statute. The States court reading of
precedent was crucial to the creation of the intangible rights doctrine. See Peter M. Oxman, Note,
The Federal Mail Fraud Statute After McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987): The
Remains Of The Intangible Rights Doctrine And Its Proposed CongressionalRestoration, 25 AM.
CPRM. L. REV. 743, 749 (1988).
19. Oxman, supra note 18, at 748. The history of the intangible rights theory has been well
documented elsewhere, so this article merely provides a summary of what rights the theory
encompasses. For a more thorough review, see id. at 747-59.
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). As one court stated, "[tihe duty breached
need not arise from state or federal law; in particular, it may stem from an employment relationship
of the sort that imposes discretion and consequently obligations of loyalty and fidelity on the
employee." United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,467 U.S.
1226 (1984) (citations omitted).
21. John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalizations of
FiduciaryBreaches and the ProblematicLine Between Law andEthics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117,
150 (1981) [hereinafter Coffee, From Tort to Crime]. The article notes the diverse applications of
fiduciary duties, with case law emphasizing "the relation need not be legal, but can be moral, social,
domestic or merely personal." Id. at 151 (quoting from Trustees of Jesse Parker Williams Hosp. v.
Nisbet, 14 S.E.2d 64,76 (Ga. 1941)).
22. See, eg., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1982) (private individual
was deemed to be a de facto public official and to have violated a duty owed to citizens by
distributing kickbacks to political allies), cert. denied,461 U.S. 913 (1983).

Washington Law Review

Vol 68:901, 1993

government.23
This right to good government includes various
intangibles like the right to an election free from fraud,24 the right of
citizens to honest and impartial government,' and the right to the loyal
and faithful service of public officials.26 One court even extended this
duty to persons who were not in fact public officials but who exerted
such control over public affairs that they became de facto public
officials, thus owing a fiduciary duty to the public.27
The second group of intangible rights, involving schemes to defraud
private parties, generally protected the employer's or other principal's
right to the honest, faithful and disinterested service of its employees or
agents.28 The majority of cases in this private sphere involve an
employee's breach of fiduciary duty to the employer.29 For example,
courts have found an actionable breach where the employee took
kickbacks," embezzled company funds,31 had an undisclosed interest in a

23. See Oxman, supra note 18, at 748 n.23 (providing an extensive list of public corruption
cases). Courts have recognized that the duty owed by public officials, appointees and employees to
the public is a fiduciary one. See, e.g., Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 121.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1153 (3d Cir.) (concluding that a scheme to
deprive an electoral body of its "political rights to fair elections" is within purview of the mail fraud
statute), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085 (1984); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 766 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied,417 U.S. 909 (1974).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1355-62 (4th Cir.) (Governor defrauded
citizens of their right to honest and impartial government by taking certain positions on pending
legislation without disclosing his personal interests), aff'd in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.
1979) (en banc), cert. denied,445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1150 (7th
Cir.) (Governor who accepted bribes for setting racing dates defrauded state and citizens of the
Governor's honest and faithful service), cert. denied,417 U.S. 976 (1974).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Bruno, 809 F.2d 1097, 1099-1105 (5th Cir.) (employees of sheriffs
department bribed judge to fix cases), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1057 (1987); United States v. Bush, 522
F.2d 641, 647-48 (7th Cir. 1975) (aide to mayor used official position to influence city officials in
awarding contracts to firm in which aide had an undisclosed interest), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977
(1976).
27. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1982) (county chairperson of
Republican party violated fiduciary duty owed by a de facto public official to citizens by distributing
kickbacks to political allies), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
28. Oxman, supra note 18, at 752.
29. Id. at 753.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1332-34 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (employee
convicted for taking bribes from contractor and not disclosing to employer that his contractor was
overcharging for the job), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); United Staes v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d
1167, 1174-75 (9th Cir.) (employee received kickbacks in obtaining insurance coverage on
employer's vehicles), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (employees who used cash
proceeds from the sale of corporate goods for non-corporate purposes bremched their fiduciary duty
to act in the best interests of the corporation).
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firm with which the employer has dealings, 2 or traded in the securities
market on inside information.33 Courts have also extended fiduciary
duties in the private sector beyond the employer-employee relationship.
The intangible rights doctrine did not stop here, however, in
safeguarding certain intangible rights.
Some courts extended protection to a "miscellaneous" group of
intangible rights unconnected to any fiduciary duty and where the victim
suffered no actual monetary or proprietary loss.35 In these few cases,
mail and wire fraud protection has reached such intangibles as the right
37
to privacy36 and rights to "time, effort, money, and expectations.
Instances of license 38 and election fraud39 may also arise where no
fiduciary duty exists between the defrauded party and the accused.
C.

Criticisms of ExpansiveInterpretationof the Statutes

This expanding protection of intangible rights by the courts prompted
criticism from commentators4" and the judiciary itself.4 Among the
32. See United States v. McCracken, 581 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1978) (employee knowingly used his
fiduciary position in employer's business to create gain for his own companies).
33. See, eg., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986) (employee of Wall Street
Journalused confidential business information to make profit on securities trading), afid,484 U.S.
19(1987).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 931 (3d Cir. 1982) (union official who
accepted payment from employer for obtaining lower wage rates defrauded union members of loyal
and faithful service), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920,
(2d Cir. 1981) (attorney engaged in conflict of interest violated his fiduciary duty to his clients,
defrauding them of his loyal service), cert. denied,456 U.S. 915 (1982).
35. See Oxman, supra note 18, at 758.
36. United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir.) (scheme to obtain confidential
commercial information from the telephone company and post office, defrauded the telephone
subscribers and post office box holders of their right to privacy and part of the service for which they
paid), cert. denied,439 U.S. 896 (1978).
37. United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7, 8-9 (4th Cir. 1979) (defendant who posed as a talent
agent to obtain sexual favors from female job applicants defrauded them of their "time, effort,
money, and expectations").
38. See, eg., United States v. Bucuvalas, 970 F.2d 937, 938-39 (Ist Cir. 1992) (involving a
scheme by private individuals to fraudulently obtain liquor licenses from municipal licensing board),
cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1382 (1993).
39. See, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909
(1974).
40. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis OfMail Fraud: The ContinuingStory of the
"Evolution" ofa White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, The
Metastasisof Mail Fraud]; Coffee, From Tort to Crime,supra note 21; Daniel J. Hurson, Limiting
the Federal Mail Fraud Statute - A Legislative Approach, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 423 (1983);
Donald V. Morano, The Mail-Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 45
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major criticisms leveled at the broad construction of the statutes is that
such interpretation is so vague and all encompassing that it potentially
covers any deceptive conduct that involves the use of the mail or wires.4"
This unlimited expansion in the criminalization of fiduciary breaches
fails to give notice to a potential defendant.4' The sweeping use of the
Finally, critics
statutes thus raised the specter of "overcriminalization."
argued that the intangible rights doctrine affords prosecutors too much
discretion in enforcing the statutes, allowing federal involvement in
matters of little federal concern. 45
From this criticism arose substantive suggestions from commentators
to limit the intangible rights doctrine. For example, Professor John
Coffee proposed introducing as an affirmative defense a causation
standard to link a breach of fiduciary duty to some actual or threatened
loss to the victim.4 6 Professor Coffee explained that such a standard
would serve as a proxy for culpability, because acts that foreseeably will
cause harm tend to be more blameworthy than those that do not.47
Another critic, David Hurson, proposed an entirely new statute to replace
the existing mail and wire fraud statutes.48 While commentators called

(1980); Ralph E. Loomis, Comment, Federal Prosecutionsof Elected State Officials For Mail
Fraud:CreativeProsecutionor an Affront to Federalism?,28 AM. U. L. REV. 63 (1978).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913
(1983):
Where a statute, particularly a criminal statute, does not regulate specific behavior, enforcement
of inchoate obligations should be by political rather than criminal sanctions. . . . [W]hat
profoundly troubles me is the potential for abuse through selective prosecution and the degree of
raw political power the free swinging club of mail fraud affords federal prosecutors.
Id. at 143 (Winter, J., dissenting).
42. Morano, supranote 40, at 78. See also Hurson, supranote 40, at 435.
43. Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government by ProsecutorialDecree: The Use and Abuse
ofMail Fraud,32 ARiz. L. REV. 137, 151 (1990).
44. Overcriminalization concerns, among other things, the adverse consequences of using
criminal law to achieve conformity with private moral standards. John C. Coffee, Jr., Hush! The
Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring
Such adverse
Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 147 (1988).
consequences include: 1) increased disrespect for the law; 2) heightened potential for corruption and
discriminatory enforcement; 3) the creation of a "crime tariff' that simply drives up prices and
eliminates competition; and 4) the misallocation of law enforcement resources. Id. at 147-48.
45. See Loomis, supra note 40, at 73.
46. Coffee, From Tort to Crime, supranote 21, at 163-66.
47. Id. at 164.
48. Hurson, supra note 40, at 457-58. Hurson's proposed statute attempted to establish a
concrete and comprehensive definition of "scheme to defraud" to give firn guidance to prosecutors
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for a legislative response to limit the coverage of the statutes, it was the
Supreme Court that took action.
D.

Limiting the Scope: McNally and Carpenter

The unchecked expansion of mail and wire fraud as a catchall device
for fraudulent activity 49 continued until 1987. In McNally v. United
States, the Supreme Court stemmed the expansionist interpretation of
mail fraud by rejecting protection of "intangible rights" by the statute. °
Prosecutors' tremendous success in utilizing the fraud statutes to strike
against political corruption and employee disloyalty thus came to a
sudden and unexpected end.
The McNally Court established that the mail fraud statute protects
people from "schemes to deprive them of their money or property," but
does not protect the "intangible right of the citizenry to good
government." 5 1 The case involved a self-dealing patronage scheme
which allegedly defrauded the citizens and government of Kentucky of
certain "intangible rights," such as the right to honest government
service. 2 In reversing the convictions of the two defendants, the
McNally Court held this conduct was not within the reach of
section 1341." 3 The Court applied the doctrine of lenity 4 in concluding
that a stricter reading of the statute limiting its scope to the protection of
property rights is the proper interpretation. 5
Six months after McNally, the Supreme Court again had the
opportunity to discuss the coverage of the mail and wire fraud statutes in
Carpenterv. United States. 6 While continuing to interpret the statutes to
protect only property rights, the Court clarified that coverage extends to

as to what fraudulent schemes to attack. Id. at 458. For a quick summary of Hurson's statute, see
Oxman, supra note 18, at 788.
49. See Hurson, supra note 40, at 435.
50. 483 U.S. 350, 360-61 (1987).
51. Id. at 356.
52. Id. at 352.
53. Id. at 361. To reach this conclusion, the Court looked to the statute's sparse legislative
history, subsequent judicial interpretation, and congressional modifications. Id. at 356-59.
54. "The Court has often stated that when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one
harsher than the other, we are to chose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and
definite language." Id. at 359-60 (citations omitted).
55. Id. The Court stated: "[W]e read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property
rights. If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has." Id. at 360.
56. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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both tangible and intangible property rights." The Carpenter Court
unanimously upheld the mail and wire fraud convictions of a Wall Street
Journalreporter who had disclosed financial information, gathered in the
course of business, to investor friends who traded on that information
In so holding, the Court
before its publication in the Journal5
recognized that confidential business information is intangible property
protected by the fraud statutes.59 Further, the CarpenterCourt stated that
a scheme to defraud does not require any showing of actual monetary
loss or injury, but can rest on a showing that the victim was deprived of
the right to exclusive use of the information? °
II.

RESTORING COVERAGE: RAMIFICATIONS OF
SECTION 1346

In response to McNally, Congress in 1988 added section 1346 to the
U.S. Code to provide mail and wire fraud coverage of the "intangible
right of honest services."61 The great majority of recent judicial
references to section 1346 conclude the amendment does not apply
retroactively.62 As such, courts have not had opportunity to address the
substantive effects of section 1346 on mail and wire fraud. 3 Yet the
interpretation of the amendment is vital to establishing the scope of the
statutes.
This section will analyze the potential impact of section 1346 and the
degree to which prosecutors may again employ the mail and wire fraud
statutes to protect intangible rights. While there are legitimate arguments
for both a narrow and broad interpretation of the amendment, a broad
interpretation is more consistent with the overall purpose of the statutes.
Regardless of which interpretation is followed, section 1346 applied
together with a Carpenterrationale of intangible property should permit

57. Id. at 25.
58. Id. at 22-24.
59. Id. at 25-26.
60. Id. at 26.
61. See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
62. See supranote 9 and accompanying text.
63. As McNally applies retroactively, courts generally conclude in those cases involving conduct
occurring prior to the enactment of section 1346, a scheme to defraud must involve property rights.
See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 867 F.2d 1232, 1233 (9th Cir. 1989). For conduct occurring
after November 18, 1988, however, section 1346 should govern. See Lynch & McConagha, supra
note 11, at 491.

910
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nearly as complete protection of intangible rights as existed before
McNally.
A.

The Problem: The Extent To Which the IntangibleRights Doctrine
Will Be Revived

The ramifications of McNally, Carpenter, and section 1346 are
uncertain.
Carpenter weakens the McNally distinction in that
prosecutors can now merely express intangible rights as intangible
property rights to avoid such limitation.' Indeed, Justice Stevens raised
this possibility in his strong dissent in McNally. 5 Further, neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has defined what the "honest services"
language of section 1346 entails, leaving opportunity once again for
varying interpretations among lower courts. 6 Commentators continue to
criticize the statutes' vagueness and call for clarification.67
The enactment of section 1346 thus raises the issue of whether the
"intangible right of honest services" 68 language completely restores the
law to its pre-McNally status. The intangible rights doctrine, overturned
in McNally, was based largely on the protection against breaches of
fiduciary duties. 9 Some courts, however, had extended the doctrine to
protect "miscellaneous" rights against schemes involving neither a
breach of a fiduciary duty nor causing pecuniary harm.70 Courts must
therefore determine if both fiduciary and non-fiduciary intangible rights
are again protected.
Only after determining the purpose behind the enactment of
section 1346 can courts intelligently apply meaning to the "intangible
right of honest services."'" As a starting point, examining the statute's
64. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections On The
DisappearingTort/CrimeDistinctionIn American Law, 71 B.U.L. REV. 193, 205 (1991).
65. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 377 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Williams, supranote 43, at 167-71.
67. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REV. 223, 269 (1992)
("The mail fraud statute's uncertainty has exceeded the bounds of mere judicial activism and entered
the arena of absurdity.... Correction is therefore needed to properly place individuals on notice of
what conduct is prohibited and to restore trust in the legal system.").
68. See supra note 8.
69. See supranotes 20-34 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
71. The first step in matters of statutory interpretation is attributing a purpose to the statute.
HENRY M.HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1157 (tentative ed. 1958). "The meaning of a statute is never plain

unless it fits with some intelligible purpose." Id.
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legislative history to determine the intent of Congress is appropriate. 2 A
review of the amendment's record, which consists only of statements by
Representative John Conyers, floor sponsor of the amendment in the
House, 3 provides some clarification of congressional intent.
Representative Conyers's statements support a broad interpretation of
the statute's purpose. He states that the amendment is intended to
overturn the McNally decision and to "restore[] the mail fraud provision
to where that provision was before the McNally decision.' 74
Additionally, Conyers says in apparent justification for the amendment
that "cases involving bribery, money laundering, election fraud, and
licensing fraud have been dismissed because there was no monetary loss
to any victim."'
Although election fraud and licensing fraud often
involve rights not easily connected to "honest services," 76 this statement
implies that Congress intended to make just such a connection. Finally,
Conyers declares that "it is no longer necessary to determine whether or
not the scheme or artifice to defraud involved money or property.""
Viewing these statements as a whole suggests that the purpose of
section 1346 is to restore as complete coverage of intangible rights as
existed prior to McNally.7"
A plain meaning interpretation of section 1346, however, is that mail
and wire fraud cover only the intangible right of the normal and ordinary
meaning of "honest services." A student commentator has made several
persuasive points in support of limiting the interpretation of "honest
services" to those cases involving a breach of fiduciary duty: 1) the
language of section 1346 includes only "honest services" and goes no
farther to include more; 2) a proposal considered in Congress that would
have protected "intangible rights of any kind whatsoever" was not
enacted; and 3) Congress's fundamental concern was the coverage of
public corruption and white-collar crime, not complete restoration of the
intangible rights theory.79 Courts could also utilize the doctrine of lenity,
72. See Gail Vasterling et al., Project, Recent Developments In CorporateAnd White Collar
Crime, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 814 n.234 (1990); Lynch & McConagha, supranote 11, at 490.
73. See Legislative History, supra note 8.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
77. See Legislative History, supra note 8.
78. See Vasterling et al., supra note 72, at 813-14 (suggesting CongrEss may have intended to
overturn the broad holding of McNally); see also Lynch & McConagha, supranote 11, at 489-90.
79. Donna M. Maus, Comment, License Procurementand the FederalMail FraudStatute, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1125, 1129-31 (1991).
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as the McNally Court did,8" to restrict the definition of section 1346's
"honest services" to its normal and ordinary meaning. Therefore, those
fraud cases involving non-honest service, non-fiduciary duty intangible
rights, for example license or election fraud,8" would still need to meet
the McNally requirement of a scheme involving money or property
82

rights.

This argument fails, however, to account for the broad statements
made by Representative Conyers implying total restoration of the preMcNally intangible rights doctrine.8"
Moreover, such a limiting
interpretation is contrary to the statutes' function and purpose as versatile
A liberal interpretation of
weapons against developing frauds."
section 1346 is thus consistent with wide protection from schemes to
defraud, a logical purpose to attribute to the mail and wire fraud statutes.
B.

The Outcome: De Facto ProtectionofAll Intangibles

Even if courts institute a narrower definition of "honest services" by
tying it to a fiduciary duty, creative prosecutors may use other theories to
extend protection of other rights formerly labeled "intangible." Some
ingenious pleading using section 1346 in conjunction with the Carpenter
decision85 should once more enable expansive protection of intangible

rights.
The plain language of the amendment undoubtedly restores coverage6
of those cases involving the service of public and private fiduciaries,
and prosecutors may use Carpenterto protect non-fiduciary intangible
rights. Since the majority of intangible rights cases in the past involved
some fiduciary duty, prosecutors should have little trouble framing most
future indictments to allege a deprivation of some sort of "honest
services." This includes some of those cases that were formerly
prosecuted under language other than honest service. For example,
prosecutors can easily restate such intangibles as the right to "good

80. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See supranotes 38-39.
See Maus, supra note 79, at 1131.
See supranotes 74-78 and accompanying text.
See Rakoff, supranote 5, at 771-72.

85. See supranotes 56-60 and accompanying text.
86. Representative Conyers's statements regarding section 1346 imply coverage of a broad range
of "honest services" in the public and private fiduciary cases by listing rights that were involved in
important pre-McNally decisions. See Legislative History, supra note 8.
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government," 87 "loyalty,' 88 and "public trust" 9 as instead involving the
right of honest services. In addition, many post-McNally courts have
stretched the Carpenterapproach to find a property right in many of the
cases that formerly may have fallen under the "miscellaneous" intangible
rights theory.90 Prosecutors can therefore plead cases not involving
fiduciary duties and "honest service" as cases which instead involve
intangible property rights.9 1
As a practical result, most if not all intangible rights are again within
the ambit of mail and wire fraud. By the language and legislative history
of section 1346, one can assert that Congress intended to restore federal
protection against schemes of public corruption and white-collar crime.
Any conclusions as to congressional purpose beyond that, however, are
mere speculation. Congress certainly did not intend to prohibit the use of
the courts' interpretative powers.92 Taking steps to define more clearly at
what point conduct becomes criminal therefore remains within the
province of the judiciary. While section 1346 again enables use of the
intangible rights rhetoric, the judiciary should design a focused approach
in interpreting "honest services."
III. CLARIFYING THE CRIME OF MAIL AND WI RE FRAUD
Congress has thus spoken, but not definitively. It likely concluded
that the fraud statutes should be broad enough to criminalize fraudulent
schemes that might not be actionable under more limiting or overly

87. See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 120 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,461 U.S. 913

(1983).
88. See United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915
(1982).
89. See United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir.), vacated,484 U.S. 807 (mem. 1987).
90. For example, many circuits have determined that license fraud involves the deprivation of
property rights. See United States v. Bucuvalas, 970 F.2d 937, 944 (1st Cir. 1992) (listing cases
accepting and rejecting license fraud as involving property rights), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1382
(1993). Further, under a Carpenterrationale, supra text accompanying notes 56-60, a court could
conclude that confidential business information like the kind in United States v. Louderman, 576
F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,439 U.S. 896 (1978), is intangible property subject to the federal
fraud statutes. See supranote 36 and accompanying text for a description o-Louderman.
91. See supranotes 56-60 and accompanying text.
92. Rep. Conyers's statements regarding section 1346 assert, "This amendment is intended merely
to overturn the McNally decision. No other change in the law is intended." Legislative History,
supra note 8.
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precise language.93 By so concluding, Congress has opted on the side of
ambiguity and declined to provide a focused response to legitimate
criticisms leveled at the statutes.94 Congress has thus delegated to the
courts the task of reconciling the two competing interests of the fraud
statutes: the need for breadth and adaptability on the one hand and the
desire for clear definition and established limits on the other.95
Responsibility thus falls on the judiciary to establish some guidelines
for mail and wire fraud offenses under section 1346. Adopting an
approach that encompasses both existing and newly developing forms of
corruption while still providing adequate notice of what constitutes
criminal conduct under the statutes is certainly no simple task. 96 The
challenges, however, are not insurmountable. Courts should clearly
define the class and conduct covered by the statutes and, specifically,
require a breach of a fiduciary duty that foreseeably could cause
pecuniary harm when applying the statutes to private individuals.
A.

Establishingthe Class and Conduct Covered by the Statutes

1.

Determining When the "HonestServices" Duty Arises

The first problem becomes determining what class of individuals is
subject to section 1346's duty of honest service. Prior to McNally, courts
generally recognized such a duty where a fiduciary relationship between
parties, both in the public and private sectors, existed.97 As one court
explained, the core of the judicially defined "scheme to defraud"
involves a trust owed to another and a subsequent breach of that trust. 98
In interpreting section 1346, courts should now at least require both
public and private fiduciaries to provide "honest services" when other

93. Lynch & McConagha, supra note 11, at 493. This purposely vague language thus provides
prosecutors a "stopgap" device permitting mail or wire fraud charges to be brought against
occurrences of criminality ill-defined in other promulgations. See Podgor, supranote 67, at 269-70.
94. See supranotes 40-45 and accompanying text.
95. See Oxman, supranote 18, at 789.
96. See id. at 786.
97. See supra notes 23-34 for cases involving actionable breaches of fiduciary duties.
98. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226
(1984).
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prerequisites are met.99 Courts must also determine, however, if the
"honest service" duty extends beyond fiduciaries.
Courts should more liberally interpret the "honest services"
requirement in the public sector than in the private sector. Certain
schemes such as license and election fraud have potential to harm the
public by defrauding the government. If indeed a purpose of the mail
and wire fraud statutes is to insure the public's right to good government,
such schemes should remain under coverage. Since "honest services" in
the public sector is the desired result, protecting the public good requires
a more generous interpretation of both the duty owed and the type of
breach that is subject to sanctions." ° In the private sector, however, such
a liberal interpretation is undesirable,' and courts should therefore
stipulate that the right to the "honest services" of a private individual
arises only when a fiduciary duty exists.
2.

Determiningthe ProscribedConduct in the Privat'eSector

Reliance on pre-McNally case law to interpret the duty of honest
service revives the concerns and criticisms of commentators in the early
1980s."0
The commentators' fear arose primarily out of decisions by
some circuit courts 3 which extended the intangible rights doctrine in
ways that opened the statutes to potential abuse."° For instance, these
decisions could be interpreted as making obligatory the disclosure of any
conflict of interest lest the fiduciary suffer the criminal consequences of
failing to provide honest and faithful services."
Such an expansive
reading would impose this disclosure obligation even if the defendant

99. When a fiduciary duty arises is another uncertainty inherent in the application of the fraud
statutes to intangible rights, an issue beyond the scope of this Comment.
100. Thus, a court may need to stretch the "honest services" requirement to fraud perpetrators
who may not owe a fiduciary duty to the public but whose fraud nevertheless affects the public good.
For example, section 1346 would cover situations where a private party defrauds a government
agency into issuing a license that enables that private party to interact with the public under a mantle
of governmental approval.
101. See infra notes 102-9 and accompanying text.
102. See supranotes 40-45 and accompanying text.
103. Two decisions that commentators found particularly alarming were United States v.
Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982), and United States v.
Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,461 U.S. 913 (1983). See Coffee, From Tort to
Crime, supra note 21, at 123-24 (analyzing implications of the Bronston decision); Hurson, supra
note 40, at 439-40 (analyzing implications of Margiottadecision).
104. Oxman, supra note 18, at 780.
105. See Coffee, The Metastasis ofMail Fraud,supranote 40, at 11.
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was relatively passive and engaged in little conduct that actually
furthered the possibility of economic harm to those entitled to honest
service. ° Fiduciaries potentially could incur criminal sanctions for a
that may not even rise to an actionable violation under
breach of10duty
7
civil law.
In the private sector, covered conduct should equate to something
more than mere fiduciary disloyalty. In the arena of private transactions,
the honest services of a fiduciary is generally a means to an end, not the
end itself. Unlike the public sector, fiduciary loyalty in the private sector
is not the overriding goal, but rather a means to obtain and preserve
pecuniary benefits for the person or entity to whom the duty is owed." 8
A fiduciary's undisclosed conflict of interest does not alone necessarily
pose the threat of economic harm to an employer. 0 9 If merely depriving
an entity to whom a fiduciary duty is owed of honest service constitutes
criminal fraud, this means/ends distinction is eliminated. Once that
distinction is lost and disloyalty alone becomes the crime, little remains
before ordinary business failure yields criminal liability."0 The difficulty
lies in delineating a point at which a breach of duty or trust rises to the
level of criminal conduct.
B.

Defining When a Breach of Duty Becomes Criminal

Adopting an approach that punishes only certain breaches of private
fiduciary duties is a reasonable means of clarifying the statutes' coverage.
Prior to McNally, in fact, many circuits had already adopted standards to
limit mail and wire fraud's reach in both public and private breach of
fiduciary duty cases. Of the various limiting doctrines suggested by preMcNally courts, the "reasonable foreseeability" of economic harm
standard is superior.' Applying such a standard would help reconcile
the competing demands on mail and wire fraud.

106. Id.
107. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 64, at 204.
108. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226
(1984).
109. Id.
110. Peter R. Ezersky, Note, Intra-CorporateMail and Wire Fraud: Criminal Liability for
FiduciaryBreach, 94 YALE L.L 1427, 1439 (1985).
111. This Comment only addresses the point at which breaches of duty in the private sector
should be punishable and specifically does not consider the propriety of adopting a similar limitation
in the public sector.
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Pre-McNallyLimitations

Certain judicially created, pre-McNally interpretations of mail and
wire fraud provide a starting point for limiting coverage where a breach
of fiduciary duty has occurred. If the enactment of section 1346 returns
the law to its pre-McNally status, these interpretations may again play a
role in defining the crime of mail and wire fraud. The earliest approach
required "active" fraud, as opposed to "constructive" fraud, as a
prerequisite for a federal fraud conviction."' A second, widely accepted
standard required a breach of duty accompanied by a "material nondisclosure or misrepresentation" to a party owed the duty."' Finally, one
circuit court adopted a test whereby some "reasonably foreseeable"
economic harm to the employer must accompany the breach of a duty." 4
Under this "reasonably foreseeable" standard, the crucial
determination is whether the private fiduciary might reasonably have
contemplated some concrete business harm to the employer stemming
from a failure to disclose the fiduciary's conflict cf interest." 5 To
convict, a jury must find that the non-disclosure furthers a scheme to
abuse an employer's trust such that an identifiable harm to the employer,

112. United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,447 U.S. 928 (1980);
Post v. United States, 407 F.2d 319, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1092 (1969);
Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 766 (6th Cir. 1949). Active fraud is distinguishable from
constructive fraud in that it requires specific intent to defraud in addition to a breach of a fiduciary
duty. Post, 407 F.2d at 329; Epstein, 174 F.2d at 765-66. Further, active fraud requires that
fiduciaries intentionally utilize their trusted position to obtain a benefit for themselves at the expense
of the person whose trust is betrayed. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1335 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. denied,467 U.S. 1226 (1984).
113. The additional element that transforms a mere fiduciary breach into a criminal offense is a
violation of the employee's duty to either disclose material information or to not make a material
misrepresentation to his employer. United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1980)
(involving non-disclosure of material information), cert. denied,450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States
v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 1975) (involving material misrepresentations by public
employee), cert. denied,424 U.S. 977 (1976). Information is material if an employee "has reason to
believe such information would lead a reasonable employer to change its business conduct." United
States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, 541 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 680 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1982).
Therefore, where an employee breaches a duty but the breach does not involve information which
would cause the reasonable employer to act differently had it known, such an employee does not
violate the fraud statutes. Id. at 541-42.
114. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,467 U.S. 1226
(1984).
115. Id. at 1337. The Lemire court expressed no opinion as to the apilicability of this test to
public officials. Instead, it noted, "[p]ublic officials may be held to a higher standard of public trust;
and conflicts of interest may harm the public merely by giving the illusion of unfairness." Id. at
1337 n.13.
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apart from the breach itself, is reasonably foreseeable.' 16 In effect, this
standard introduces something akin to the proximate cause concept into
these criminal statutes. 7 The breach must be capable of causing some
reasonably foreseeable harm to the employer, although no harm need
result to find the employee guilty."'
The first two limitations, while moving the interpretation in the right
direction, are inferior to the "reasonably foreseeable" standard. The
distinction between actual and constructive fraud fails to embrace a
substantive connection between the intent and the breach of duty. As
such, this standard is too imprecise in defining when fraudulent intent is
sufficient to merit imposing sanctions." 9
The second "material
information" standard improperly shifts the focus away from the intent of
the accused toward the probable actions of the victim. An employer
presumably would change its business conduct only if, upon disclosure
of the conflict of interest, it saw opportunity for profit or savings, or
dangers of economic harm. 20 This notion of materiality, taken one
logical step further, should focus on whether the employee reasonably
foresees potential economic harm to the employer stemming from the
employer's ignorance of the conflict.''
Criminal statutes should
concentrate the inquiry on the intent of the accused necessary to establish
culpability.2
The "reasonably foreseeable" criterion provides the best guidance for
consistent application without being overly restrictive. It adds one more
link in the mail and wire fraud chain, with the inquiry progressing from
"honest services" to breach of a fiduciary duty to the reasonable
foreseeability of such breach causing some concrete harm. This standard
serves solely as a measure of intent, not as an additional requirement of
proof of harm. The intent necessary for conviction must rise above a
mere intentional failure to disclose a conflict of interest to the level of
foreseeably causing harm. Imposing such a test to the statutes does not

116. Id. at 1337.
117. This final judicial standard is somewhat analogous to the proposed causation standard
offered by Professor Coffee. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
118. See supranote 13 and accompanying text.
119. This problem is evidenced by the courts' failure at times to recognize or institute this "actual
harm" distinction when dealing with intentional non-disclosure cases.
120. Lemire, 720 F.2d at 1338.
121. Id.
122. See Coffee, From Tort to Crime, supranote 21, at 164.
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contravene the legislative intent behind section 1346," because this
standard was in place well before the McNally decision. Courts should
therefore uniformly adopt such a standard in private fiduciary "honest
services" cases.
2.

Justifying a "ReasonablyForeseeable"Limitation

Incorporating a foreseeability test into the "honest services"
requirement of private fiduciaries takes a needed step to provide a better
measure of criminal intent and to give potential defendants notice of
when a scheme will be deemed criminal in nature. Criminal statutes
should punish only those who have engaged in the proscribed conduct
and have the necessary intent. Because the statutes do not require proof
of monetary or economic harm, this standard would act as an imperfect
proxy for culpability 24 to punish only those schemes that are criminally
blameworthy. Criminal law should require a more exacting standard of
proof of fraudulent intent than a mere intentional violation of a private
duty standing alone. Proof of intent through a breach of duty coupled
with foreseeable harm provides a better measure of criminal conduct.
Further, tying "honest services" to a breach of duty where economic
harm is foreseeable to the reasonable individual provides private
fiduciaries some standard to judge the propriety of their actions.
This standard will not unduly conflict with Congress's apparent desire
in enacting section 1346 to keep the fraud statutes flexible. First, this
standard would only apply to fiduciary relationships in the private sector,
leaving unfettered the prosecution of public corruption cases where
honest services is the desired goal. Second, this test will enable
prosecutors to continue their use of the fraud statutes to attack new forms
of fraud as they develop so long as the scheme can foreseeably cause
some concrete harm to the private entity to whom a duty is owed.
Because reasonable foreseeability is itself an inexact concept, it is ideal
to apply here as a mediating doctrine capable of capturing novel frauds
without criminalizing essentially harmless ethical transgressions in the
business world.'25 The reasonably foreseeable standard thus permits
wide application of the statutes without such an ad hoc approach by the
courts.

123. The record reflects Congress's intent to return the law to its pre-McNally status. See supra
text accompanying note 74.
124. See supratext accompanying note 47.
125. See Coffee, From Tort to Crime, supranote 21, at 169.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The enactment of section 1346, restoring mail and wire fraud
coverage of the "intangible right of honest services," once again places
the responsibility of interpretation on the judiciary. Courts must
determine if Congress intended the expansive protection of intangible
rights as existed prior to the McNally decision or merely the protection of
plain meaning "honest services." Given the broad statements in the
amendment's legislative history, total restoration of the intangible rights
doctrine is a legitimate interpretation. Regardless, section 1346 used in
conjunction with the Carpenter interpretation of intangible property
rights should effectively protect most, if not all, of those intangible rights
that were protected before 1987.
Congress likely concluded that adding overly precise language to the
crime of mail and wire fraud would impair the statutes' effective
application to new and developing forms of fraud. Congressional revival
of protection of intangible rights, however, still requires the courts to
Restricting the
establish criteria to measure "honest services."
application of the mail and wire fraud statutes in private sector cases to
breaches of fiduciary duties that have a reasonable foreseeability of
causing pecuniary harm provides a flexible limitation. While it does not
solve all of the statutes' problems, it takes a step to reconcile the
competing demands on these criminal statutes.

